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Introduction "For the past hundred years the rate of growth of output in the developing world has depended
on the rate of growth of output in the developed world. When the developed grow fast the developing grow fast, and when the developed slow down, the developing slow down. Is this linkage inevitable?" (Sir A. Lewis 1979) For most of the time in the past, the economic development of developing countries has been considered to be highly dependent on the level and dynamism of economic activity in the industrialized world, particularly in the United States. External factors and external shocks were attributed a great importance in the determination of the economic fate of the countries in the global South. And they seemed to be more relevant than ever in an era of intensified global economic integration starting in the 1970s, usually labeled "globalization" and shaped by an ideological paradigm known as "neoliberalism". Also, the outstanding boom experienced by almost the entire However, this time -according to a number of observers, columnists, economists, and (stock) market analysts -the nature and reach of the boom were different in the sense that it had led to a longer-term strengthening at least of the most dynamic and most potent economies in the developing world. In this interpretation, which gained considerable prominence in certain economic circles in the years 2007 and 2008, this last economic boom and the longer-term economic consolidation it apparently triggered for emerging economies and particularly for the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) have allowed them to "decouple" from the economic developments in the industrialized hemisphere. 2 In view of the initial resilience of many developing countries against contagion from financial and economic turmoil in the US, the old proverb "when the US sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold" was said to have lost its relevance. However, in the light of more recent events and developments in the global economy it can be claimed that this announcement of decoupling was premature. In fact, the still ongoing financial and economic crisis has had much more repercussions on the economies of the developing world than initially thought. This can be taken as indication that the myth of decoupling lacks substance.
Taking a descriptive approach and examining and interpreting recent data, the present paper aims at collecting evidence for dismantling the notion of decoupling. It starts with a brief sketch of what is commonly meant by the term "decoupling". The next section analyses how the current economic crisis spread over the entire globe, highlighting various channels of transmission. This is taken as a first counterevidence against decoupling. Examining these spillover channels, it will be demonstrated that emerging economies have been harshly affected by this crisis that initially emerged in the industrialized world. Going one step further, the fourth section shows that key economic indicators of industrial countries on the one hand and emerging markets on the other hand have moved in tandem, undermining the notion of decoupling even more. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
A brief sketch of "decoupling"
Even a long time after the end of the colonial era, the profound dependence of developing countries' economic well-doing on the prosperity of industrial countries was reflected, inter alia, in more or less pronounced co-movements of economic activity in the global North and the global South 3 . This dependence also helped to explain the clustering in time of growth successes and collapses of developing countries during the 20 th century (Ocampo/Ros 2008 : Ch. 1, Ocampo et al. 2009 . Against this historical backdrop, to some optimistic observers and business analysts it looked like the world economic system had undergone a substantial transformation when (at least until As a result, there are a number of slightly different and varyingly far-reaching definitions in use.
While some focus specifically on stock markets, what is usually meant with "decoupling", though, is a shrinking relationship between the economic activity in industrial countries on the one hand and emerging market economies on the other hand. A narrower interpretation claims that a certain "divergence" or "de-synchronization" of business cycles has taken place (Kose et al. 2008: 4) .
Proponents of a more comprehensive definition of "decoupling", however, suggest that -thanks to a diversification in the sources of economic growth (i.e. strengthening of growth in domestic demand components while lowering the relative contribution of exports), structural changes and domestic policy improvements -emerging market economies have reduced external vulnerabilities and, thus, become more resilient to external and global shocks. The combination of these developments, in turn, has allegedly allowed emerging markets to become more independent of, i.e. to "decouple" from advanced economies in recent years (The Economist 2009a , Kohn 2008 . At the extreme end, however, some even go as far as viewing emerging market economies, and in particular China, as "new engines" or "new locomotives of global growth" (Das 2006; Smith 2006; Financial Times 2009a) .
Facing this lack of a consistent widespread definition of "decoupling", we have to come up with our own version. In fact, we will base our analysis on a rather broad definition and refer to the "decoupling" of the aggregate of emerging market economies from the industrialized world as a whole, while paying special attention to the BRIC countries. Basically, our understanding of "decoupling" relates to the question whether there are actually divergences in economic performance among different regions of the world economy. In this perspective, "decoupling" refers to the degree of sensitivity of economic activity in emerging economies to external or global factors. In that sense, we stick to the latter of two definitions identified by Levy-Yeyati (2009) , according to whom "decoupling" has "two distinct interpretations: business cycle synchronicity (in the sense of globally synchronised expansions and recessions) and sensitivity (closer to the cold metaphor)", with the "cold metaphor" saying that "whenever the world [catches] a cold, emerging markets [get] pneumonia" (ibid.). Examining both financial and real economy indicators, we will try to answer Sir Arthur Lewis' question quoted at the beginning of this paper, i.e. whether or to which extent the economic fate of emerging markets is still dependent on the economic activity in developed countries.
The spreading of the current crisis: channels of transmission
In the years before the crisis almost every developing and emerging economy experienced a However, not all developing countries are affected in the same way. For exporters of manufactures and services (especially tourism) the dominant transmission channel of the crisis is the fall in trade volumes whereas exporters of primary goods are particularly affected by commodity price trends (Griffith-Jones/Ocampo 2009: 7). In the following, these two transmission channels will be examined.
a) Declining export demand
As can be seen in Figure 1 , emerging market economies were particularly hard hit by the cutback in world trade. Both in terms of value and volume, their exports have fallen more pronouncedly than developed countries' exports. Among the countries that are most affected are those Asian exporters for which manufacturing exports take a sizeable share of GDP, e.g. Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. They suffer from the fact that the purchase of investment and durable consumer goods is easier to defer than that of foods and basic services (UNCTAD 2009a: 19-20) . Table 1 ). Source: EUROSTAT (2009: 4) As a consequence of slipping import demand from the US and the EU, the current account surpluses of developing Asia (including China and India), the newly industrialized Asian economies 8 , and the developing and emerging economies in general have shrunk while the trade balances of Western Hemisphere countries have turned negative (see Fig. 3 ). In the latter case and particularly in the case of the South American exporters of primary goods, however, this deterioration is not only related to falling demand but also to declining commodity prices. 2, see also Table 2 ). However, the boom came to an abrupt end in mid-2008 with "the downturn in commodity prices (…) first triggered by a reorientation of speculative influences" (UNCTAD 2009a: 7) and then exacerbated by the deterioration of both global economic prospects and global demand. BRIC countries, Russia is the most affected by these trends, owing to its dependence on oil exports.
Overall, commodity price volatility has been a key channel of crisis transmission from the advanced to all developing and emerging economies (Bhushan 2009: 4) . 
Financial transmission channels
The bursting of the US house price bubble in mid-2007 roiled international financial markets but the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was the decisive turning point, "replacing financial exuberance by financial fear" (Palley 2008 ) not only in the US but on the entire globe.
Financial contagion spread quickly across regions and asset classes, with private capital flows being among the key channels of crisis transmission.
a) Foreign capital flows
In reaction to the mid-September 2008 meltdown, credit to emerging markets banks and businesses was frozen and capital outflows were registered through two channels: investors' typical "flight to quality" (in particular to US Treasury bonds) and "the sale of assets throughout the world to finance the withdrawal of resources from mutual and hedge funds in the USA" (Ocampo 2009: 713 Source: UNCTAD (2009a: 17) In short, far from being isolated from the turmoil in advanced economies, the financial markets of developing and particularly of emerging economies were hit hard, confirming "the strong correlation between markets that are not fundamentally related to each other but are subject to the same kind of global portfolio management decisions." (UNCTAD 2009a: 17) 4. Co-movement of key economic indicators: Is this really "decoupling"?
As has been shown, the crisis that originated in the US spread across the globe within a bit more than a year, taking different channels of transmission to different countries and regions. In a lot of these countries, contagion was severe and the effects of these spillovers dramatic, both on the real economy and on financial markets. These will be analyzed in the following, before taking a specific look at the BRIC countries and, finally, discussing "decoupling".
Real economy effects of the spreading of the crisis
Almost all developed countries slipped into recession in the course of 2008. In 2009, advanced economies as a group registered a negative growth rate of 3.4%. Meanwhile, although developing and emerging economies do not slide into a downright recession, they follow suit, experiencing a considerable growth slowdown (see Fig. 6 
Effects on financial markets
With economic growth down and unemployment up, inflation decreased not only in industrial countries but also in emerging economies, signaling a global rather than a regional downturn of economic activity (see Fig. 8 ). In view of this, national authorities had to adapt their monetary policy.
While several central banks in emerging economies initially raised their key interest rate in an attempt to halt capital outflows, all of them have now followed the US Federal Reserve's downward move at least since the beginning of 2009 (UNCTAD 2009a: 27).
Fig. 8: Global Inflation (12-month change in consumer price index unless otherwise noted)
Source: IMF (2009a: 3) 13 However, this data seems to be indeed very fragmentary. Other sources report that in China alone 41 million jobs have been lost due to the crisis. Additionally, job losses were estimated at 580,000 in South Korea and more than one million in Thailand (Financial Times 2009b) .
In international financial markets, as was shown above, sentiments deteriorated radically in September 2008, with capital outflows and rising risk premia hitting emerging economies severely.
The effects of this were manifold. Not only did risk spreads skyrocket in the initial panic, they also remained higher (see Fig. 5 ) and much more volatile than in the years prior to the shock. Source: Ocampo (2009: 713) In summary, there have been clear co-movements in all of the main economic indicators of the aggregate of industrial countries on the one hand and the aggregate of emerging economies on the other hand. In the cases of capital (out)flows and emerging market risk spreads, in turn, the reversals were induced by events in the industrialized hemisphere. Let us now take a closer look at those emerging markets that have been said to be the strongest, the most dynamic and the most promising cases for "decoupling", namely the BRIC countries.
The BRIC countries
So, as has been shown, on the aggregate, developing countries and emerging market economies remain to a considerable degree coupled to the industrialized world. A first glance at real GDP growth rates suggests continuing coupling also for the BRIC countries, at least to a certain degree. As depicted in Figure 10 , all the BRIC countries experience a trough at the same time the US does. Although the degree of contagion varies and although only two of them (Brazil and Russia) undergo a recession in 2009, none of them has remained unaffected. In the following, some arguments will be presented for each of the four countries that shed doubts on their "decoupling". China is arguably the country that comes closest to decoupling with its powerful growth performance. But also China has suffered from a growth slowdown. As Figure 10 shows The flipside of the importance of exports for the Chinese economy is that the domestic market's contribution to economic growth is underdeveloped, particularly that of private consumption. China still lacks a broadly-based middle class with purchasing power. 20 In fact, only 37% of aggregate demand is household consumption 21 ; exports make up the same share, namely 38%. During the last decade, these two components of aggregate demand have experienced inverse developments: while the share of private consumption has fallen by 9 percentage points (from 46% in 1999), exports have almost doubled their share in aggregate demand from 20% in 1999 to 38% in 2008. In other words, the domestic market is still too weak to be a sustainable "locomotive of growth" for China, let alone for the world economy. This is also true for the current growth acceleration which is primarily due not to private sector activity but to the authorities' countercyclical policies consisting of a massive fiscal stimulus package (amounting to almost 600 million US$ or 6.2% of GDP 22 ), loose monetary policy and a credit boom fueled by lending from state-controlled banks that were ordered by the government to extend new loans (Financial Times 2009f, 2009g, 2009h, The Economist 2009b , UN 2009 . In view of all this, China's economy clearly still remains "coupled" to the industrialized world's economies. 18 Yet, China's exchange rate policy has also a secondary objective: With its policy of anxiously maintaining the Renminbi's peg to the dollar, China also tries to hold its ground against competition from other emerging markets (Financial Times 2009c) . 19 Data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), International Economic Accounts Database. 20 According to recent estimates, China's middle class population, defined as those with annual income of at least US$5,000, now numbers between 100 and 150 million people (The Economist 2009c , Chang 2008 . This is about 10% of the total population. 21 By comparison, in 2008 household consumption accounted for, respectively, 71% of US GDP, 61% of Brazil's GDP, 55% of India's GDP, 66% of Mexico's GDP, 54% of Korea's GDP, and 49% of Russia's GDP. 22 In terms of percent of GDP, this is more than any developed country government is spending, including the US with a fiscal stimulus package of 5.5% of GDP (UNCTAD 2009a: 32).
There are some who argue that Asia, and China in particular, is not as dependent on exports to advanced countries as is usually believed because regional trade has intensified a lot (The Economist   2009b ). Yet, "Asian countries can trade parts and components amongst themselves all they like (…) but they still need someone to buy their final products" (Eichengreen 2008 ) -and final demand for Asian goods still comes mainly from the world's major industrial countries. In fact, more than 60% of Asian exports are ultimately headed for G-3 economies, i.e. the US, euro zone, and Japan (Park 2009 ).
With its ample current account surpluses, Asia's contribution to global demand falls short of its actual income. In contrast to the G-3 economies where consumption is only slightly below production, Asia consumes a mere 70% of what it produces (Park 2009 ).
Considerable hope has also been set on India as potential shock absorber in the global economic system, even though India is not as integrated into world economy as China. Still, as Ghosh and Chandrasekhar (2009: 725) assert, "[t] he view that the Indian economy would be less adversely affected by the global economic crisis because of limited integration and other inherent strengths has proved to be wrong." Rather, they argue, the economic boom that preceded the current downturn was crucially nourished by three external factors: first, increasing reliance on exports (in particular of services); second, rising dependence on inflows of foreign capital; and third, the role these inflows Russia is still an energy-based economy that heavily depends on oil and gas and their exportation, particularly to the EU but increasingly also to China (Financial Times 2009k). With exports amounting to 31% of GDP, foreign trade plays an important role for the Russian economy. So do international financial markets, not only as a source of capital but also as a source of volatility. In a sharp reversal of depreciation pressures caused by falling oil prices and ruble sell-offs a year ago, the value of the ruble currently shows a strong tendency to go up, following the rise in oil prices (Financial Times 2009l) . In other words, Russia's economy is still closely tied to the international economy, particularly via the oil price.
Some initial discussion of "decoupling": fact or fiction?
During the boom years prior to the crisis, a number of analysts fervently advocated the idea of "decoupling" emergent market economies. When the crisis started to spread over the entire globe, affecting also all emerging economies, however, the belief in decoupling faded quickly. But while the proponents of decoupling were muted by the diffusion of the crisis, they reappeared when the recovery of emerging markets preceded the recovery of the industrialized countries. Improving stock market and real economy data were interpreted as proof of their increasing strength -and of decoupling (Palit 2009 ). Indeed, many emerging economies have already rebound (see above) and among the bestperforming stock markets in 2009 are almost only those in emerging economies (Financial Times 2009m) . However, this interpretation overlooks the fact that the stabilization of the economy in advanced countries and the return of "appetite for risk" among international investors (and the improvement of market sentiments in general) were prerequisites for the recovery in emerging markets.
In any case, discussion on decoupling has revived recently, with both proponents and opponents declaring victory. The proponents of decoupling usually refer to an empirical study by Kose et al. (2008) who make a cautious case for decoupling. According to their findings, the importance of global factors for emerging markets' economic activity has waned over time and their business cycles have increasingly desynchronized from those of industrial countries. In contrast, Rose (2009) , Levy-Yeyati (2009) and Wälti (2009a) all conclude that there is little evidence for decoupling. Wälti (2009a) argues that as emerging markets saw a tremendous take-off in economic growth during the last two decades, their trend growth rates have diverged significantly from those of industrial countries (see Fig. 11 ). In order to avoid misleading conclusions when assessing the "decoupling" hypothesis, he suggests that instead of looking at real GDP growth figures one has to focus on the deviation of actual growth rates from trend growth rates. (Wälti 2009b) Looking at the deviations of the actual from the trend growth rates for both advanced and emerging economies, they seem to be very similar and move in tandem (see Fig. 11 ). On the basis of this analysis, Wälti (2009b) concludes that "decoupling was always a myth". This is in line with what we have found above. Our empirical analysis has shown that there are still pronounced co-movements in key economic indicators. 
Concluding remarks:
There is no doubt that in the recent past a number of emerging economies, above all the so-called BRIC countries, have considerably strengthened their (macro)economic position and gained resilience against external shocks. However, many of the circumstances on which this invigoration was based were exceptional and they revealed rather than refuted the importance that external and global factors still have for the developing world. It must not be forgotten that it was the combination of a global economic boom, high liquidity in international financial markets and a historical commodity price boom that enabled many developing and emerging economies to run current account surpluses which allowed them to reduce external debts and build up foreign exchange reserves. Yet, global economic prosperity is elusive and international capital flows are (in)famous for their volatility. Relying to much on them creates economic vulnerability.
Even so, compared to most other historical periods, many emerging economies have indeed become slightly less sensitive to economic developments in the industrialized world. However, to talk about "decoupling" means to throw out the baby with the bath water. The current financial and economic crisis has demonstrated that even the bigger and stronger emerging markets remain closely tied to the fate of the developed world and thus vulnerable to external shocks. Despite the new strengths described above, all developing and emerging economies experienced either a recession or a considerable slowdown. Behind this lies the fact that -because of globalization -national economies have become more integrated. On the real economy side, it is obvious that international trade has gained importance for almost any country, thus making economic growth more reliant on export demand. At the same time, global business networks and cross-border production chains have made economies increasingly characterized by vertical specialization which has resulted in a major expansion of intra-industry trade, thereby amplifying contagion during times of crisis. On the financial markets side, emerging markets have successively opened up to international capital flows (mostly originating from developed countries), exposing themselves to the sentiments of foreign investors. All this has perpetuated or even reinforced economic linkages among countries in general and between -25 -emerging and advanced economies in particular. Even the most potent of all emerging markets, China, with its huge (potential) domestic market and its large FX reserves, remains heavily sensitive to developments in the world economy and its exports markets. Now some argue that many commodity exporters (like Brazil) and Asian economies are loosening their ties to rich countries and actually coupling to China. Apart from the fact that this would not really be "decoupling" either, these economies are, in essence, not decoupling from the developed world because this is where most of the final demand comes from. So, after all, emerging economies remain tightly linked to the world economy and its dominant players. Thus, decoupling -defined as decreasing sensitivity of economic activity in emerging economies to external and global factors -has so far been rather a myth than part of reality.
